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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the warrantless entry into defendant Richard's house and 
the subsequent warrantless arrest of Mr, Richards were lawfully 
effected? 
2. Whether defendant Richards unlawfully interfered with police 
officers while being arrested? 
3. Whether the evidence presented to the jury is sufficient to 
uphold the conviction of Mr. Richards on the disorderly conduct 
charges? 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
A defendant convicted in a criminal action may take an 
appeal to the Court of Appeals. Authority for such and appeal is 
provided in Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated 
iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Richards was charged by information with violation 
Section 76-3-305 of the Utah Case Annotated by Unlawfully 
Interfering with a police officer making a lawful arrest: with 
violation Section 76-9-102 (l)(b)(i) of the Utah Code Annotated by 
unlawfully engaging in disorderly conduct: and with violating 
Sections 76-5-102,4 of the Utah Code Annotated by unlawfully 
assaulting a police officer. At the conclusion of trial, the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty on the charges of interfering with a 
police officer and engaging in disorderly conduct, and a verdict of 
not guilty on the charge of assaulting a police officer. The 
defendant has appealed these convictions and the purpose of this 
brief is to respond to the argument which defendant has raised on 
appeal. 
v 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Stewart a resident in a mobile home park in Salt Lake 
County was contacted by Zina Richards, the defendant's wife, at 
10:15 p.m., on June 11, 1987. The Richards are neighbors of Mr. 
Stewart and Zina used his telephone to call Brent Richards, the 
defendant's brother. Zina wanted Brent to come over because she and 
the defendant were arguing. Zina remained with the Stewarts until 
Brent arrived along with his brother Burt, at which time she 
returned with them to her trailer next door. 
A short time later, Mr. Stewart was outside his trailer. He 
spoke with Mr. Floyd DeLeon, Zina's father who had arrived to visit 
his daughter. An argument was in progress in the defendant's 
trailer, and raised voices could be heard from outside the home. At 
Mr. DeLeons suggestion, Mr. Stewart called the police (T.61). At 
approximately 11:26 p.m., two uniformed West Valley Police Officers, 
entered the mobile home park. Officer Plotnick was in a police dog 
truck, and Officer Bankhead was in his patrol car, accompanied by a 
civilian "ride-along" named Craig Heesch. 
The officers spoke to Mr. Stewart who expressed concern for 
Zina's safety. They heard raised voices coming from defendants 
trailer, and observed a group of men inside the trailer who were 
arguing, and who appeared to the officer to be in the process of 
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"squaring off" (T.72, 116). Thereupon, the officers moved to the 
trailer and knocked on the door. 
Larry Richards, the defendant, opened the door. Officer 
Plotnick indicated the police were responding on a family fight 
call, and that he wanted to see Mrs. Richards (T.76,77). The 
officers thought Larry Richards appeared tense and agitated. Larry 
told the police that everything was fine, and then began to shut the 
door. Officer Plotnick placed his foot across the threshold into 
the residence to prevent the door from being closed. 
Testimony differs as to what occurred next. The officers 
stated that the defendant shoved Officer Plotnick in the chest. The 
defendant indicated he was simply trying to close the door. Officer 
Plotnick then pushed open the door for the purpose of arresting 
Larry Richards for the assault. He told Mr. Richards at that time 
that he was under arrest. Officer Bankhead followed Officer 
Plotnick into the trailer. Also, the police dog entered the trailer 
having been released form the truck outside by a remote control 
device operated by Officer Plotnick. 
The defendant then struggled with Officer Bankhead in the 
course of the arrest. He pulled his hands away so as to avoid being 
handcuffed (T.122). After struggling for approximately a minute and 
a half, he was subdued. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The police officers who entered the defendant's home had a 
reasonable belief that his wife inside and that her safety as in 
jeopardy. When defendant refused to permit police access to his 
wife, police were justified in entering the home by force without a 
warrant, under the "exigent circumstances" exception the general 
requirement that a warrant be obtained. Further, police were 
justified in arresting defendant with out a warrant on the charges 
of assaulting a police officer, because that offense had been 
committed in their presence. 
Defendant's arrest was lawful, and therefore he had no 
justification for resisting or interfering with the police* The 
fact that the jury acquitted the defendant on the charge of 
assaulting a police officer is not dispositive of the issue as 
defendant contends. The standard for the jury is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The standard for the police in making an arrest 
is probable cause, and in this instance the police had probable 
cause to believe they had been assaulted by the defendant. 
The evidence presented to the jury is sufficient to uphold 
their conviction of defendant on this charge. Many witnesses 
testified as to the loud voices which could be heard outside at a 
late hour, and that the defendant was involved in an argument that 
was on the threshold of erupting into physical violence. Such 
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evidence cannot be simply dismissed as inconclusive or insubstantial 
as defendant would suggest. Such evidence supports the verdict of 
the jury, and to overturn that verdict in the face of such evidence 
would not be proper. 
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
BOTH THE ENTRY INTO THE DEFENDANT LARRY RICHARD'S HOME AND 
HIS SUBSEQUENT ARREST WERE LAWFUL, EVEN THOUGH POLICE ACTED WITHOUT 
A WARRANT, 
It is an established principle of criminal procedure that a 
police officer may enter a private residence without a warrant if 
exigent circumstance are present. In fact, defendant concedes this 
point (Page 9, Appellant's Brief). Exigent circumstances can be 
said to exist in a situation where there is reason to believe that a 
substantial risk of bodily harm exists if the police do not enter 
the private residence. The question for analysis then is whether at 
the time the Defendant shut his door and Officer Plotnick placed his 
foot inside the residence to prevent the door from closing, did 
Officer Plotnick have a reasonable belief that a substantial risk of 
bodily harm existed. 
What then could have Officer Plotnick reasonably believed as 
he stood on the porch about the welfare of Zina Richards, the 
defendant's wife? Upon responding on the family fight call, Officer 
Plotnick initially spoke with Mr. Stewart, Zina's neighbor, who had 
actually called the police. Mr. Stewart testified that Zina had 
come over to use his telephone, that she started crying and said 
that defendant was on drugs, and that she was afraid to go back home 
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(T.60). For this reason she called her father and brother-in-law to 
come and help. According to Mr. Stewart, she was nervous and afraid 
(T.61). Mr. Stewart testified that when he advised Zina's father of 
these circumstances that Zina's father suggested that the police be 
called (T 61). 
While discussing the situation with Mr. Stewart, Officer 
Plotnick could hear voices inside the defendant's home. He observed 
the defendant standing inside the trailer with two other males, and 
they appeared to be "squaring off, their "arms were moving" and they 
appeared to be "quite angry" with each other (T.72). Because of 
what Mr. Stewart had told him about Zina's circumstances, and 
because it appeared to him that a fight was about to break out 
inside defendant's trailer, Officer Plotnick testified that he 
became concerned for Zina's safety (T. 75) 
Officer Plotnick knocked on the door of defendant's home. 
When defendant opened the door, Officer Plotnick asked to see his 
wife. When defendant indicated the officer could not see his wife, 
and began to shut the door, Officer Plotnick testified he prevented 
defendant form doing so by sticking his foot in the doorway(T. 77). 
and even defendant's own witness, Brent Richards, testified that 
when Officer Plotnick knocked on the door he asked to see Zina, the 
defendant's wife (T.163). 
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Clearly, Officer Plotnick has a reasonable belief that Zina, 
the defendants wife, was subject to a substantial risk of bodily 
harm. He had spoken to a neighbor who was concerned for Zina, and 
who had contacted the police at the direction of Zinaes father, A 
short time before his arrival, Zina had appeared frightened and was 
crying and had indicated to her neighbor that she was fighting with 
her husband who was using drugs. The officer then observed an 
on-going dispute with in the defendant's trailer that appeared on 
the verge of becoming physical. Finally, defendant denied Officer 
Plotnick's request to see Zina. Appelle would submit to the Court 
that under these circumstances Officer Plotnick would have been 
derelict in his duties had he not entered the residence so as to 
ascertain Zina's condition. In further support of Officer 
Plotnick's entry, appelle could argue that the crime of disorderly 
conduct had been committed in his presence and a warrantless entry 
was justified to effectuate an arrest for that crime. 
Appellant goes on to argue that the warrantless arrest of 
Mr. Richards in the house for the assault is unlawful. Appellant 
contends that because the jury acquitted defendant on the charge of 
assaulting Officer Plotnick, that therfore no public offense 
occurred which would provide a basis for police entry into the home, 
and the arrest which followed. 
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Section 77-7-2/ U.C.A. (1953), as ammended generally states 
an officer may make an arrest without a warrant for a "public 
offense" committed in his or her presence. The public offense can 
be an infraction, a misdemeanor, or a felony. In this instance, 
Officer Plotnick and Bankhead believed Plotnick had been assaulted 
(T.77) and were attempting to arrest defendant Richards for that 
offense. 
It is clear that an arrest must be supported by probable 
cause. Under the classic definition of probable cause, the police 
must have reasonable trustworthy information that a crime as or is 
being committed and that the arrestee committed or is committing 
the crime. (See generally Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); 
Brumeaaer v United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) and Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 594 (1981). 
Probable cause means more than mere suspicion, but it does 
not require proof sufficient to establish guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This, Appellant's contention that the arrest of defendant 
becomes unlawful because he was acquitted of the assault charge is 
clearly shown to be erroneous. (See Draper v. United States 359 
U.S. 307 (1959) and United States v. Mallock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974What 
is required for a lawful arrest is a fair probability that a crime 
has been committed. IN the case at hand, two police officers 
testified that they observed the defendant shove one of them in the 
chest. Clearly, probable case existed for them to believe that the 
offense of assault on a police officer had been committed. 
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Judge Thorne was correct when he stated as follows in 
response to defendant's motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the 
state's case: " . . . the testimony that I have heard substantiates a 
lawful arrest. The law does not require that a person be guilty of 
an offense in order to be arrested for that offense. Simply that 
the arrest be made on the basis of probable cause, and I think that 
the officer's judgment of what occurred to him, although it may or 
may not be ultimately right, he is entitled to make that arrest: 
(T.142). 
xiv 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT RICHARDS HAD NO LAWFUL JUSTIFICATION FOR 
INTERFERING WITH THE POLICE WHO WERE ATTEMPTING TO ARREST HIM. 
Defendant here contends that because his arrest was proven 
unlawful by the fact that the jury acquitted him of th assault 
charge for which he was arrested, that therfore his resistance to 
the arrest was justifiable. Defendant relies on the Bradshaw case 
to support his position that one may properly resist an unlawful 
arrest. 
Again it is the contention of Appellee that the arrest in 
this instance was lawfully supported by probable cause. Both 
officers testified that they observed defendant shove Officer 
Plotnick in the chest. Even defendant's own witness, Craig Heesch, 
gave testimony consistent with that of the officers when he state 
that shortly after the door was opened , he observed Officer 
Plotnick to make a "sudden move, backwards, away from the door" 
(T.147). Because there was probable cause for the officer to 
believe that a crime had been committed, the arrest of Larry 
Richards was a lawful arrest. Additionally, he was arrested for the 
offense of disorderly conduct, for which he was convicted, and 
clearly one may not with impunity interfere with a police officer 
who is making a lawful arrest. 
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In this instance the officers were both in uniform. The 
defendant knew the police had arrive even before they knocked on the 
door (T. 230). After Officer Plotnick was shoved, he told the 
defendant the he was under arrest. The defendant himself testified 
that he heard the police tell him that he was under arrest. The 
defendant himself testified that he heard the police tell him that 
he was under arrest (T. 230). 
Thereupon, thee defendant interfered with the arrest by the 
use of force. Officer Plotnick testified that th defendant 
"struggled" (T. 84). Officer Bankhead testified that the defendant 
fought with him for approximately a minute and a half while being 
handcuffed (T.122). Even defendant's brother testified that 
defendant scuffled and prevent cops form handcuffing him (T.175). 
Because the arrest was lawful, and because the element of 
the interfering offense were proven at trial, the jury verdict of 
guilty for this offense should stand. 
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT III 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT WAS PRESENTED TO 
THE JURY TO UPHOLD THEIR CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT RICHARDS ON 
THAT CHARGE. 
The Court below instructed the jury as to the elements of 
disorderly conduct (T.276). The State was required to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant "intending to cause a public 
annoyance, inconvenience or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk 
therof, engaged in fighting or in a violent, tumultuous or 
threatening behavior, or that the made unreasonable noise in a 
private place which could be heard in a public place." 
The evidence presented to the jury indicated that the 
incident took place in the late evening hours (approximately 11:30 
p.m.) in a residential area (a trailer park). Mr. Stewart, the 
defendant's neighbor, testified that the voices inside defendant's 
trailer were "boisterous" (T.62). Officer Plotnick testified that 
he could hear voices inside the trailer, and that three males inside 
the trailer could be seen to be in the process of "moving their 
arms" and "squaring off", and that they were quite angry with each 
other: (T.72) This testimony was supported by that officer 
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Bankhead. Defense witness Craig Heesch testified that he as a 
civilian ride-along with Officer Bankhead, and that he remained in 
the officer's patrol car parked across the street from defendants 
residence and that from that location he observed inside defendant's 
trailer that two "male individuals were standing nose to nose" and 
also the he could hear that* somebody was speaking loudly" (T.145). 
Defendant's father-in-law, who testified on behalf of defendant 
stated that defendant and his brothers were arguing and that they 
talked "pretty loud" (T. 153). Defendant's wife Zina testified that 
defendant was "freaking out:"(T. 205), and that the brother were 
angry with each other and raised their voices at each other (T. 
218).And the defendant himself testified that when the police 
arrived he said "we must have been talking too loud" (T.230). 
In reviewing a conviction, the Court in State v. Booker, 709 
P. 2d 342 (Utah 1985) stated as follows: "So long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which finding of all 
the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our 
inquiry stops". On appeal it is the defendant's burden to establish 
that the evidence at trial was so inconclusive or insubstantial as 
to preclude the jury from properly finding guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See State v. Kerekes, 622 P. 2d 1161 (Utah 
1980) . In this case, with respect to the crime of disorderly 
conduct, the evidence available to the jury was neither 
insubstantial nor inconclusive, and for this reason the guilty 
verdict should stand. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, appellee request that 
appellants appeal be dismissed so that the defendants conviction by 
jury on the charges of Disorderly Conduct and Interfering with a 
Police Officer might stand. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of November 1988. 
JOHN SPIKES*/ / 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
7-7-2.By peace officers. 
A Peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a 
warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of 
any peace officer: "presence" includes all of the physical sense or 
any device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range or any 
physical sense, or records the observations of any of the physical 
senses: 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has 
been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person 
arrested has committed it: 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has 
committed a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for 
believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission 
the offense: or 
(c) injure another person or damage property 
belonging to another person. 
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76-8-305. Interference with peace officer making lawful 
arrest. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has 
knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have 
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest 
or detention of himself or another and interferes with such arrest 
or detention by use of force or by use of any weapon. 
76-9-102. Disorderly conduct. -(1) A person is guilty of 
disorderly conduct if: 
(a) He refuses 3 no to comply with the lawful order of the 
police to move from a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous 
or physically offense condition, by any act which serves no 
legitimate purpose; or 
(b) Intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or 
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk therof: 
(i) He engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or 
threatening behavior; or 
(ii) he makes unreasonable noises in a public place; or 
(iii) He makes unreasonable noises in a private place which 
can be heard in a public place: or 
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(iv) He engages in abusive or obscene language or makes 
obscene gestures in a public place; or 
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means 
any place to which the public or a substantial group of the public 
has access and includes but is not limited to streets, highways, and 
the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office 
buildings, transport facilities, and shops. 
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the 
offesnse continues after a request by a person to desist. Otherwise 
it is an infraction. 
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